Introduction
This extended abstract presents a logic, called Lp, that is capable of representing and reasoning with a wide va riety of both qualitative and quantitative statistical in formation. The advantage of this logical formalism is that it offers a declarative representation of statistical knowledge. Knowledge represented in this manner can be used for a variety of reasoning tasks.
The logic differs from previous work in probability logics in that it uses a probability distribution over the domain of discourse, whereas most previous work (e.g.,
Nilsson [1] , Scott et al. [2] , Gaifman [3] , Fagin et al. [4] ) has investigated the attachment of probabilities to the sentences of the logic (also, see Halpern [5] for further discussion of the differences).
The logic Lp possesses some further important fea tures. First, Lp is a superset of first order logic, hence it can represent ordinary logical assertions. This means that Lp provides a mechanism for integrating statistical information and reasoning about uncertainty into sys tems based solely on logic. Second, Lp possesses trans parent semantics, based on sets and probabilities of those sets. Hence, knowledge represented in Lp can be un derstood in terms of the simple primative concepts of sets and probabilities. And finally, the there is a sound proof theory which has wide coverage (the proof theory is complete for certain classes of models). The proof theory captures a sufficient range of valid inferences to subsume most previous probabilistic uncertainty reason ing systems. For example, the constraints generated by
Nilsson's probabilistic entailment [1] can be generated by the proof theory, and the Bayesian inference underlying belief nets [6] can be performed. In addition, the proof theory integrates quantitative and qualitative reasoning as well as statistical and logical reasoning.
In the next section we briefly examine previous work in probability logics, comparing it to Lp. Then we present some of the varieties of statistical information that Lp is capable of expressing. After this we present, briefly, the syntax, semantics, and proof theory of the logic. We conclude with a. few examples of knowledge representation and reasoning in Lp, pointing out the
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1 advantages of the declarative representation offered by Lp. We close with a brief discussion of probabilities as degrees of belief, indicating how such probabilities can be generated from statistical knowledge encoded in Lp.
2

Other Probability Logics
Previous work in probability logic has investigated the attachment of probabilities to sentences. To appreciate the difference between this and the expression of statisti cal information consider the two assertions: "The prob ability that Tweety can fly is 0.75," and "More than 75Y. of all birds can fly . " The first state ment is an expression of a degree of belief. It is ex pressing the internal state of some agent-an agent who believes the assertion "Tweety can fly" to degree 0.75.
It is not an objective assertion about the state of the world (i.e., an assertion that is independent of any be lievers). In the world Tweety can either fly or not fly there is no probability involved. The second statement, on the other hand, is making an objective true-false as sertion about the state of the world; i.e., in the world there is some percentage of birds that can fly and this percentage is either 75% or some other number.1
This example shows that there is an essential differ ence between the attachment of a probability to a sen tence and the expression of a statistical assertion. As has been demonstrated in work presented at the pre vious uncertainty workshop (Bacchus [7] ) probabilities attached to sentences, which have been the focus of pre vious work on probability logics, op. cit., are not capable of efficiently expressing statistical assertions.
There has been some work similar to Lp. This work is discussed in more detail in Bacchus [8] . viewed as denoting the set of birds, i.e., the set of in dividuals that satisfy the formula. Sentences in Lp can be used to assert that the probability of this set (i.e., the measure of the set of individuals that satisfy the for mula) possesses various properties. For example, the Lp sentence "[Bird(x)] x > 0.9" asserts that the probability of the set of birds has the property that it is greater than 0.9. 2
The second idea is to have a field of numbers in the semantics as a separate sort. With numbers as a sep arate sort the probabilities become individuals in the logics. That is, the probabilities become numeric terms3
2This uncondition&l probability does not make much sense; it is through the use of conditional probabilities that meaningful statistical assertions can be made. For exam ple, the Lp sentence "[Fly(x)IBird(x)]x > 0.9" makes an auertion about the relative probability of flying birds r.mong birds, i.e., about the proportion of birds tha.t fly.
3This means that the probabilities are :field-valued not re&l-valued. There are technical difficulties with using the re&ls instead of a. field of numbers. In particular, it is not possible to give a. complete axiomatization of the re&ls with out severely restricting the expressiveness of the logic. We can be assured, however, that the field of numbers will al ways contain the rational numbers, so the probabilities can be any rational number that we wish (in the range o-1, of course).
and, by asserting that these terms stand in various nu meric relationships with other terms, we can assert vari ous qualitative relationships between these probabilities.
In the above example, '[Bird(x)]x' is a numeric term, and the sentence asserts that it stands in the 'greater than' relation with the numeric term '0.9'. The exis tence of numbers as a separate sort also allows the use of 'measuring' functions, functions that map individuals to numbers. An example of such a function is 'Weight', which maps individuals to a number representing their weight (in some convenient units). The measuring func tions greatly increase the expressiveness of the logic."
Syntax
We now present in a bit more detail the exact syntax of Lp. This description should give the reader a better idea of the types of sentences that one can form in the language.
We start with a set of constant, variable, function, and predicate symbols. The constants, variables, and pred icates can be of two types, either field or object. 5 The function symbols come in three different types: object, field, and measuring functions. The measuring functions will usually have special names like Weight or Size.
Along with these symbols we also have a set of dis tinguished symbols, including the following field sym bols: 1, 0 (constants), =, � (predicates), +, -, x, and ..;-6 (functions). The symbol = is also used to represent the object equality predicate. Also included is the logi cal connective '!\', the quantifier 'V', and the probability term formers'[',']'.
Formulas
The major difference between the formulas of Lp and the formulas of first order logic is the manner in which terms are built up. TO) A single object variable or constant is an o-term; a single field variable or constant is an f-term. The formulas of Lp are built up in the standard man ner, with the added constraint that predicates can only apply to terms of the same type. The notable difference with first order logic is that f-terms can be generated from formulas by the probability term former. For ex ample, from the formula "Have(y, x)/\Zoo(x)" the f-term "[Have(y, x)/\Zoo(x)] x " can be generated. This term can then be used to generate new formulas of arbitrary com plexity, e.g.,
In this formula some of the variables are universally quantified while the 'x' is bound by the probability term former. The intuitive content of this formula can be stated as follows: if there are two animals one of which is rare while the other is not then the measure (proba bility) of the set of zoos which have the rare animal is less than the measure of the set of zoos which have the non-rare animal.
Through standard definitions we add V, ---> , :3, and the extended set of field inequality predicates, �. <, >, and E (denoting membership in an interval). We use infix form for the predicate symbols = and � as well as for the function symbols+, x, -,and+.
Conditional probabilities are represented in Lp with the following abbreviation. 
Semantic Model
This section outlines the semantic structure over which Lp is interpreted. As indicated above it consists of a two sorted domain (individuals and numbers) and a probabil ity distribution over the set of individuals. What was not discussed was the need for a distribution over all vectors of individuals. This is necessary since the open formulas used to generate the probability terms may have more than one free variable. Hence one may need to examine the probability of the set of vectors of individuals which satisfy a given formula.
An Lp-Structure is defined to be the tuple M: The product measure ensures that the probability terms satisfy certain conditions of coherence. For ex ample, the order of the variables cited in the probability terms makes no difference, e.g., (a]:e,y = [a]y,.,. Another example is that the probability terms are unaffected by tautologies, e.g., (P(�) 1\ (R(y) V ·R(y))](.,,y) = [P(�)J.,.
It should be noted that this constraint on the proba bility functions is not equivalent to a restrictive assump tion of independence, sometimes found in probabilistic inference engines (e.g., the independence assumptions of the Prospector system (12] , see Johnson [13] ).
Semantics of Formulas
The formulas of Lp are interpreted with respect to the semantic structure in the same manner as first order for� mulas are interpreted with respect to first order struc tures. The only difference is that we have to provide an interpretation of the probability terms. As indicated above the probability terms denote the measure (prob ability) of the set of satisfying instances of the formula.
In more detail:
We define a correspondence, called an interpretation, between the formulas and the Lp-Structure M aug mented by the truth values T and 1. (true and false). An interpretation maps all of the symbols to appropriate entities in the Lp-Structure, including giving an initial assignment to all of the variables.
These assignments serve as the inductive basis for an interpretation of the formulas. This interpretation is built up in the same way as in first order logic, with the added consideration that universally quantifi ed ob ject variables range over 0 while universally quantified field variables range over :F. The only thing which needs to be demonstrated is the semantic interpretation of the probability terms. In other words, the probability term denotes the prob ability of the set of satisfying instances of the formula. Since IJn is a probability function which maps to the field of numbers :F, it is clear that [a],. denotes an element of :F under the interpretation a; thus, it is a valid f-term.
Examples of Representation
We can now give a indication of the representational power of Lp. By considering the semantic interpretation of the formulas it should be reasonably clear that the formulas do in fact represent the gist of the stated English assertions. 10
1. More politician& are lawyer& than engineers.
2. The proportion of flying birds decrea.&es with weight.
Here y is a field variable.
3. Given R the property P i& independent of Q. This is the canonical hi-functional expression of inde pendence (see Pearl [9] ).
[P ( 
4.
Quantitative notions from statistics, e.g, The height of adult male human• i1 normally distributed with mean 177cm and standard deviation 13cm:
Here normal is a fi eld function which, given an interval (y, z) 11, a mean, and a standard devia tion, returns the rational number approximation12 of the integral of a noJmal distJibution, with spec ified mean and standard deviation, ovel the given interval.
Deductive Proof Theory
This section outlines the deductive proof theory of Lp.
The proof theory provides a specification for wide class of valid inferences that can be made from a body of knowl edge expressed in Lp. In particular, it provides a full specification for most probabilistic inferences, including Baysian inference, all first order inferences, as well as inferences which follow from the combination of quali tative and quantitative as well as statistical and logical knowledge.
The proof theory consists of a set of axioms and rules of inference, and can be shown to be both sound. It can also be shown to be complete with respect to various classes of models. The proof theory for Lp is similar to the proof theory for ordinary first order logic. The major change is that two new sets of axioms must be introduced, one to deal with the logic of the probability 10 It. should be noted tha.t the aim is to give some illustta.tive examples, not to capture all of the nuances of the English assertions.
110ne would probably want to constrain the values of y and z further, for example, y < z.
1' A rational number approximation is returned since the numbers are from a totally ordered field, not necessarily the reals. It is well known that every totally ordered field contains the rationals (MacLane [14] ). 4 function, and another set to define the logic of the field :F.
The axioms include the axioms of first order logic (e.g., (15] ) along with the axioms of a totally ordered field (MacLane [14] ). There are also various axioms which specify the behavior of the probability terms. We give some examples of these axioms to give a indication of their form.
Some of the Probability Function Axioms
where i == {:z:1, ••• , :z:,.), and every :z: ; is an object variable.
The first axiom simply says that if all individuals sat isfy a given formula then the probability of this set is one (i.e., the probability summed over the entire domain is one). The other axioms state similar facts from the calculus of probabilities.
Rule of inference
The only rule of inference is modu8 ponens, i.e., from {a, a--+ fi} infer j3.
If we also have an axiom of finiteness (see Halpern [5] ) then the above axioms and rule of inference comprise a sound and complete proof theory for the class of models we have defined here (i.e., models in which 0 is bounded in size and where the probabilities are field valued). Let � be a set of Lp sentences. We have:
TheoremS (Soundness) If� f-a, then� f= a. 
Example 1 Niluon'8 Probabilistic Entailment
Nilsson [1] shows how the probabilities of sentences in a logic are constrained by known probabilities, i.e., con strained by the probabilities of a base set of sentences.
For example, if [P 1\ Q] = 0.5, then the values of [P] a.nd [Q] are both constrained to be 2: 0.5. Nilsson demon strates how the implied constraints of a base set of sen tences can be represented in a canonical manner, as a set of linear equations. These linear equations can be used to identify the strongest constraints on the proba bility of a new sentence, i.e., the tightest bounds on its probability. These constraints are, in Nilsson's terms, probabilistic entailments. These bounds are simply consequences of the laws of probability. And, since the proof theory of Lp is com plete with respect to the finite sample spaces that Nils son uses, these probabilistic entailments can be deduced from the proof theory of Lp. Bayes' theorem is immediate in Lp. Lemma 2 (Bayes' Theorem) The following i& prov able in Lp:
Consider the Bayes' Net in figure 1 . If all of the variables X 1-X4 are propositional (binary) variables one could write them as one place predicates in Lp. Hence, the open formula ' X 1 ( ;r: ) ', for example, would denote the set of individuals with property X 1. The Bayes' Net gives a graphical device for specifying a product form for the joint distribution of the variables X , [6] . In this case the distribution represented by the Bayes' Net in the figure could also be specified by the Lp sentence
It can easily be demonstrated that any probability distribution which satisfies this equation will also satisfy every equation of the same form with any number of the predicates negated (uniformly). For example, the
will be satisfi ed by every probability distribution which satisfies the first equation. Furthermore, the proof de pends only on finite properties of the probability func tion, i.e., only on properties true of the fi eld valued prob abilities used in the Lp-structure. Hence, by the com pleteness result, all such equations will be provable from the first via Lp's proof theory. This means that the behavior of the Bayes' net is cap tured by the first Lp sentence. That is, the fact that this product decomposition holds for every instantiation of the ptopositional vaiiables xi is captured by the proof theory.
In addition to the structural decomposition Bayes' nets must provide a quantification of the links. This means the conditional probabilities in the product must be specifi ed.
In [X 1( z) I X2(z) A _, X4(z) ]x. Again these probabilities will be semantically entailed by the product decomposition and by the link conditional probabilities. Thus, the new probability values will be provable from the proof theory.
Of course the proof theory has none of the computa tional advantages of the Bayes' net. However, what is important is that Lp gives a declarative representation of the net. The structure embedded in the net is repre sented in a form that can be reasoned with and can be easily changed. There is also the possibility of automat ically compiling Bayes' net structures from declarative Lp sentences. Furthermore, the proof theory captures all of the Baysian reasoning within its specification, and offers the possibility of integrating Bayes' net reasoning with more general logical and qualitative statistical rea soning. Hence the proof theory gives unifying formalism in which both types of infexences could be understood. our degree of belief that Tveety can :fly, given that all we know about Tveety is that he is a bird, is equal to the proportion of birds that can :fl.y. The main complexi� ties arise when we know other things about Tweety, e.g., when we know that Tveety is a. penguin a.s well a.s a. bird.
